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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE MEXICAN
WRIT OF AMPARO*
HECTOR FIX ZAMUDIO**

The writ of amparo is considered to be the most important
procedural device in the Mexican legal system; it thus attracts
a substantial body of literature, including works by commentators from Spain,' Italy,2 Germany,3 the United States,4 Mex* Translated from Spanish by Dr. Carl E. Schwarz, Professor, Fullerton College, California; Visiting Lecturer, California State University, Los Angeles, California (Political Science/Public Law).
** Director, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurfdicas, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma
de M6xico.
1. See N. ALCALA-ZAMORA Y CASTILLO, ENSAYOS DE DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL, PENAL, Y CONSTITUCIONAL 524-26 (Argentina 1944); J. GONZALEZ PEREZ, I DERECHO
PROCESAL ADMINISTRATIVo 240-70 (Spain 2d ed. 1963); Gonzalez Perez, El Proceso de
Amparo en MAicoy Nicaragua,[1954] REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACION P6BLICA 297 (Spain);
G6mez de Baquero, ElAmparo del Derecho."Jursdiccibn o Recurso?, [1928] REVISTA GENERAL DE LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA 114 (Spain); A. ALVARADO, EL RECURSO CONTRA LA INCONSTrTUCIONALIDAD DE LAS LEYES 72-73 (Spain 1920); R. REYES, LA DEFENSA
CONSTITUCIONAL: RECURSOS DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD Y AMPARO (Spain 1934); Reyes,
Para Espaa- Motivos Constituyentes, [19311 REVIsTA GENERAL DE LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA 571 (Spain).

2. Italian commentators have shown a remarkable interest in the study of the Mexican
amparo. See M. CAPPELLETTI, LA JURISDICCION CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA LIBERTAD (H. Fix
Zamudio trans. 1961); M. CAPPELLETTI, EL CONTROL JUDICIAL DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LAS LEYES EN EL DERECHO COMPARADO (C. G6mez Lara & H. Fix Zamudio
trans. 1966); Secci, Profi Costituzionali e Processualidel "Juicio de Amparo" Messicano,
[19671 REVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRTTO E PROCEDURA ITALIANA DI DiRITTO E PROCEDURA
PENALE 209 (published in Spanish as Lineamientos ConstilucionalesyProcesalesdel Juicio de
Amparo Mexicano, [1967] BOLETIN DEL INSTITUTO DE DERECHO COMPARADO DE MEXICO
461 (H. Fix Zamudio trans. 1967)); Esposito, Amparo. Il Giudizia di Legittimita Costituzionali
Negli Stall Uniti delMessico, [ 19671 TEMi ROMANA 362; DE FRANCO, Il Giudizio di Amparo
Messicano e il Sindicato de LegittimitA Costituzionale Delle Leggi in Italia (1967-68) (unpublished thesis available at the Faculty of Law, University of Rome).
3. See, e.g., Horn, Das Amparo-Ve fahren in Mexiko, in VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN
162 (Germany 1968); Barberis, Vefassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Mexiko, in
]OBERSEE
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 392-416 (Germany 1962).
4. For the most complete study published in the United States, see R. BAKER, JUDI-

A STUDY OF THE AMPARO SUIT (1971). See also Clagett, The
Mexican Suit of "Amparo" 33 GEO. L.J. 418 (1945); Eder, JudicialReview in Latin America,
21 OHIO ST. L.J. 570 (1960); K. KARST, LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS
FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY 614-46 (1966); K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPCIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO:
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ico, 5 and Latin America.6 In spite of the amparo's international
127-60 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LAW AND DESchwarz, The Mexican Writ ofAmparo."ExtraordinaryRemedy Against Official
Abuse ofIndividualRights, [1969-1970] PUBLIC-AFFAIRS REPORT 10-11; Schwarz, Exceptions
to the Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies Under the Mexican Writ of Amparo. Some Possible Applications to Judicial Review in the United States, 7 CAL. W. L. REV. 331 (1971);
Schwarz, Judges Under the Shadow-JudicialIndependence in the United States and Mexico, 3
CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 260 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Schwarz, Judicial Independence];
Schwarz, Rights and Remedies in the FederalTrial Courts of Mexico and the United States, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (1977); Schwarz, The Mexican Writ of Amparo and Extraordinary
Judicial Remedies Against Official Abuse in the United States (1971) (unpublished thesis
available in the University of California, Santa Barbara, Library) [hereinafter cited as
Schwarz Thesis]. Anglo-American authors writing in Spanish are J. GRANT, EL CONTROL
JURISDICCIONAL DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LAS LEYES (1963); Headrick, El Control
Judicialde Las Leyes, XVI REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MEXICO 437 (1966).
5. Because the Mexican bibliography on the writ of amparo is so substantial, only the
most significant works will be noted. See I. VALLARTA, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO Y EL WRIT
DE HABEAS CORPUS (Mexico City 1881); I. VALLARTA, I-IV CUSTIONES CONSTITUCIONALES:
MENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK
VELOPMENT];

VOTOS DEL C. IGNACIO L. VALLARTA, PRESIDENTE DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA EN

LOS NEGOCIOS MAS NOTABLES (Mexico City 1879-1883); E. RABASA, EL ARTiCLO 14: EsTUDIO CONSTITUCIONAL (Mexico City 2d ed. 1955); E. RABASA, EL JuIcIO CONSTITUCIONAL: ORiGENES, TEORiA, Y EXTENSiON (Mexico City 2d ed. 1955); J. LOZANO, ESTUDIO
DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL PATRIO EN LO RELATIVO A LOS DERECHOS DEL HOMBRE

(Mexico 2d ed. 1972); S. MORENO CORA, TRATADO DEL JUICIO DE AMPARO CONFORME A
LAS SENTENCIAS DE LOS TRIBUNALES FEDERALES (Mexico 1902). Among the more recent
studies are I. BURGOA, EL JuIcIO DE AMPARO (Mexico 1977); J. PALACIOS, INSTITUCIONES
DE AMPARO (Mexico 1959); R. LE6N ORANTES, EL JuIcIO DE AMPARO (Mexico 3d ed. 1957);
H. BRISEO SIERRA, EL AMPARO MEXICANO (Mexico 1971); J. TRUEBA BARRERA, EL JUICIO
DE AMPARO EN MATERIA DE TRABAJO (Mexico 1963). See also the very current and extensive A. NORIEGA, LECCIONES DE AMPARO (Mexico 1975); 0. HERNANDEZ, CURSO DE
AMPARO (Mexico 1966); L. BAZDRESCH, CURso ELEMENTAL DEL JUIC1o DE AMPARO (Mexico 1971); A. GONZALEZ CosIo, EL JuICIo DE AMPARO (Mexico 1973); A. TRUEBA, DER-

(Mexico 1974).
6. Argentinian authors include R. BIELSA, EL RECURSO DE AMPARO 279-88 (Argentina 1965); R. BIELSA, III ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PuBLICO (Argentina 1952); S. Linares
Quintana, Tratado de la Ciencia del Derecho ConstitucionalArgentinoy Comparado, in 5 LA
LIBERTAD CONSTITUCIONAL LIBERTADOS PARTICULARES 381 (Argentina 1956); S. LINARES
ECHO DE AMPARO

QUINTANA, ACCION DE AMPARO: ESTUDIO COMPARADO CON EL JuIcIO DE AMPARO DE

MEXICO Y EL MANDATO DE SERGURIDAD DE BRASIL 39-56 (Argentina 1960); G. BIDART
CAMPOS, DERECHO DE AMPARO (Argentina 1961); G. BIDART CAMPOS, REGIMEN LEGAL Y
JURISPRUDENCIAL DEL AMPARO (Argentina 1968); C. S.ANCHEZ VIAMONTE, EL HABEAS
CORPUS: GARANTiA DE LIBERTAD (Argentina 2d ed. 1956); C. SA NCHEZ VIAMONTE, JUICIO
DE AMPARO (Argentina 1967); Fonrouge, Facultadde Declararla Inconstitucionalidadde la
Leyes, 31 REVISTA JURIDICA ARGENTINA LA LEY 966 (Argentina 1943). Brazilian authors
include Buzaid, Juicio de Amparo e Mandado de Seguranca, in PRIMER CONGRESO MEXICANO Y SEGUNDAS JORNADAS LATINOAMERICANAS DE DERECHO PROCESAL 107 (Mexico
1960); J. OTHON SIDOU, 0 "JUICIO DE AMPARO" (Brazil 1958); J. OTHON SIDOU, Do
MANDADO DE SEGURANCA 131-62 (Brazil 3d ed. 1969); J. CASTRO NUNES, Do MANDADO
DE SEGURANCA 52 (Brazil 6th ed. 1961); A. WALD, Do MANDADO DE SEGURANVA NA PRATICA-JURICIARiA 68-76 (Brazil 3d ed. 1968); T. BRANDAO CAVALCANTI, Do MANDADO DE
SEGURANcA 33-40 (Brazil 4th ed. 1957). Other outstanding Latin American writers include

the Uraguayans Bidard, El Amparo y el Srlnema de GarantiasJurisdiccionalesdel Derecho
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fame as legal doctrine, foreigners unfamiliar with the writ in operation find it complex and difficult to comprehend. It is therefore the
purpose of this article to provide Anglo-American lawyers with an
overview of an institution that has become extremely complex
through its origins, juridical evolution, practical operation, and
procedural development. References to Spanish language studies
will be condensed to the most fundamental and stress placed instead on sources in English and other idioms more readily available
and comprehensible to Anglo-American lawyers.7
It is important to note at the outset the lack of a principle in
the Mexican legal system comparable to stare decisis. Decisions of
the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice and collegiate circuit courts
are only considered binding on the lower courts when, in similar
factual contexts, their decisions hold the same point of law in five
consecutive cases. Moreover, theurisprudencia,or system of precedents, of the Mexican courts has not acquired the importance of the
principle of stare decisis established by the Anglo-American legal
system. Thus, references to Mexican decisional law will be limited
to decisions of fundamental importance to an understanding of the
amparo and its national impact.8
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Mexican writ of amparo is the result of a slow and painful
Uruguayo, in PRIMER CONGRESO MEXICANO Y SEGUNDAS JORNADAS LATINOAMERICANAS
169 (Mexico 1960); E. VESCOVI, EL PROCESO DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LA LEY 32-33 (Uruguay 1967); Vescovi, La Proteccion Procesalde las Garantias
Individuales en America Latina, [1967] REVISTA IBEROAMERICANA DE DERECHO PROCESAL
478; E. OBLITAS POBLETE, RECURSO DE AMPARO 11-19 (Bolivia 1967); A. BOREA ODRIA, LA
DEFENSA CONSTITUCIONAL: EL AMPARO (Peru 1977).
DE DERECHO PROCESAL

7. For works by Mexican commentators in other languages, see Vidal, Mexican
Amparo Proceedings, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: SELECTED PAPERS AND REPORTS 82 (1941); Cabrera & Headrick, Notes on Judicial Review in Mexico and the United States, 5 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 253 (1963); Fix
Zamudio, Judicial Protection of the Individual Against the Executive in Mexico, II GERICHTSSCHUTZ GEGEN DIE EXEKUTIVE 713 (1970); Alcal1-Zamora y Castillo, id. at 771; F.
BERMUDEZ, LA PROCEDURE D'AMPARO CONTRE LES ACTES ET LES Lois CONTRAIRES A LA

CONSTITUTION DU MEXIQUE (France 1914); Eschanove Trujillo, La Procedure Mexicaine
d'Amparo, [1949] REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 229 (France); Escalante, Le
Contentieux de la Legalite des Actes Administratives, [1952] REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT COMPARE 285 (France); Escalante, Le Contentieux de la Lgalite des Actes
Administratives, [1952] REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 596-611 (France); Camargo, The claim of "Amparo " in Mexico." ConstitutionalProtectionof Human Aights, 6 CAL.

W. L. REV. 201 (1970).
8. For Mexican Supreme Court decisions, see KARST, supra note 4, at 632-46; LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at 13-48.
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evolution which combines both foreign and national influences. 9
Foreign contributions can be divided into three main currents.
A.

United States Influence

The first, and most obvious, influence derives from the public
law of the United States, just as the latter influenced the majority of
Latin American countries in the first years after independence from
Spain.10 Through the Anglo-American example, the creators of the
Mexican amparo tried to introduce the basic principles of judicial
review of the constitutionality of laws. However, this concept of
judicial review was revealed to the amparo's creators primarily
through the classic work of the French publicist Alexis de Tocqueville in his La D,mocratie en Amrique," the first edition of
which was published in Paris in 1836. De Tocqueville's work became known in Mexico the following year. It was translated into
Spanish in 1855,12 the same year that the Constituent Congress produced the Federal Constitution of 1857, Mexico's first "constitutionalization" of the writ of amparo.
Due attention must also be given to the influence of the classic
Anglo-American writ of habeas corpus which was incorporated into
the amparo proceeding, although without the traditional name by
which it is known throughout the rest of Latin America. 13 The
public law of the United States also influenced the adoption of the
Mexican federal system, the protection of which was later entrusted
to the writ of amparo and the federal courts.' 4
B.

Spanish Influence

The Spanish influence was less evident than that of the United
States, but it was inevitable after three centuries of political and
9. For information on the origins of the writ of amparo,see BAKER, supra note 4, at 345; Clagett, supra note 4, at 420-22.
10. See generally Eder, supra note 4.
11. The first edition was published in French by Charles Gosslein (1835), and in English as DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (H. Reeve trans. 1835).
12. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN LA AMiRICA DEL NORTE

(D.A.

Sinchez de Bustamante trans. 1855).
13. See Eder, Habeas Corpus Disembodied- The Latin American Experience, XX CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E.

YNTEMA 473 (K. Nadelmann, A. von Mehrens & J. Hazard eds. 1961).
14. In fact, the first Constitution of the independence period was called The Federal
Constitution of the United Mexican States. Article 123 of this fundamental charter established that "[t]he Federal Judicial Power shall reside in the Supreme Court of Justice, in the
circuit courts, and in the district courts," obviously reflecting United States influence.
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cultural domination in New Spain. The name "amparo" derives
from its antecedents in the provinces of Castille and Aragon.' 5 To
the Spanish influence is also owed the judicial centralism established during the Colonial Period which determined the subsequent
concentration of judicial review in the federal courts via the writ of
amparo and thus detracted from a truly federal structure of governmental power which, as noted above, was taken from the United
States Constitution of 1787.16
C. French Influence
The influx of French law must also be credited with influencing the evolution of the writ of amparo. The French influence came
from: (1) the declarations of the rights of man, known as "individual guarantees" 17 in the constitutions of Mexico and which in principle were considered to be the real basis of the protective reach of
the amparo;1 8 (2) the attempt to emulate the Conservative Senate of
the French Constitution of Year VIII, by the creation of a Supreme
Conservative Power in the constitutional provisions of 1816; 9 and
(3) the most far-reaching - the influence of various elements of
French "cassation" power.2 °
D.

National Influence

In addition to the above three main currents of foreign influence, national influence on the writ of amparo reflected the need
15. Much has been written on the Hispanic origins of the amparo writ; however, citations will be limited to those works treating the influence of the Aragonese royal courts (fueros aragoneses) as documented by the Spanish historian and lawyer Vfctor Fairen Guilldn.
See V. FAIREN GUILLEN, ANTECEDENTES ARAGONESES DE LOS JuIcIOS DE AMPARO (Mexico 1971). For an account of the contributions of the law of Castille, which directly influ-

enced the Spanish colonies in America, see A. LIRA GONZi.LEZ, EL AMPARO COLONIAL Y
EL JuIcIO DE AMPARO MEXICANO (Mexico 1972); see also Coy, Justicefor the Indian in
Eighteenth Century Mexico, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 41 (1968).
16. See Noriega, El Origen Nacionalylos Antecedentes Hispdnicosdel Juicio de Amparo,
IX REVISTA DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES 151 (No. 50, 1942).

17. But see I. Burgoa, LAS GARANTiAS INDIVIDUALES 108-48 (10th ed. Mexico 1977).
18. The Constitution of 1857 established that the amparo will lie only against violations
of individual rights. See CONSTITUcI6N POLITICAS DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS
(Mex. 1857) art. 101 [hereinafter cited as 1857 CONST.].
19. This institution is referred to specifically as The Organization of a Supreme Conservative Power. See SECOND CONST. LAW OF Dec. 20, 1836, arts. 1-23.
20. See text accompanying notes 82-87 infra. This influence was broadly recognized in

Mexican legal commentary, especially by Fernando Vega. See Vega, El Juicio de Amparoy
el Recurso de Casacion Frances,in 2 REVISTA DE LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCLA 68 (E.
Rabasa & V. Costillo eds. 1889) and in 8 REVISTA DE LA ESCUELA NACIONAL DE JURISPRUDENCIA 231 (No. 31, 1946).
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felt by government leaders and jurists for an effective procedural
instrument to protect against official acts, those fundamental rights
of the citizenry, including the right to challenge laws of dubious
constitutionality. The formation of this political awareness occurred rather slowly and on occasions imprecisely. However, the
following salient stages are particularly noteworthy.
First, two institutional protections of constitutional principles
were introduced - without a full understanding of their effects in the Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States on October 4, 1824. The first empowered the federal Congress to repress
constitutional violations, a power which derived from the Spanish
Constitution of Cadiz of 1812;21 the second conferred upon the federal Supreme Court authority to decide violations of the Constitution and federal statutes, a power which reflected the influence of
the United States Constitution. 22 The first of these was by far the
most important in light of the fact that Congress struct down various state statutes as in conflict with the federal Constitution.23
Second, the "Seven Constitutional Laws" of 1836, a centralist
unitary governing document, established a Supreme Conservative
Power for the primary purpose of protecting the constitutional-political order. As noted earlier, the Supreme Conservative Power
was inspired by a similar system adopted in the French Constitution of 22 Frimaire of the Year VIII (December 3, 1799), which
owed much to the ideas of Abb6 Sieves. However, the haphazard
organization and ingenuous authority of the Supreme Conservative
21.

According to articles 372 and 373 of the Spanish Constitution of CAdiz of 1812:

The Courts in their initial examinations will take in consideration constitutional
violations made sufficiently manifest to be enjoinable by the appropriate remedy
and to carry out the official responsibility of those who committed the violations
. . . . All Spaniards have the right to petition the Courts or the King to secure
observance of the Constitution.
Articles 164 and 165 of the Mexican Constitution of 1824 established:

The Congress will define all laws and decrees governing the exercise of authority of
those violating this Constitution or the enabling legislation . . . . Only the Con-

gress can interpret ambiguities arising over the intent of the articles of this Constitution or the enabling statutes.
22. The 1824 Constitution established that the Supreme Court of Justice could review

"violations of the Constitution and general laws, in a manner to be prescribed by statute."
CONSTITUCI6N POLITiCAS DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS (Mexico 1824) art. 137

(V)(b) [hereinafter cited as 1824 CONST.]. This provision was evidently modeled after article
111(2) of the United States Constitution, which provides that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the laws of the
United States .... "
23.

Various congressional declarations annulled laws of the states as unconstitutional,

especially during the year 1829. See II LEGISLACION MEXICANA 89-223 (M. Dublan & J.
Lozano eds. 1876).
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Power determined its eventual failure.2 4
Finally, an instrument known as reclamo (demand, or claim)
replaced the Supreme Conservative Power in 1841. This was one of
the many reforms of the 1836 Constitution instituted between the
years 1840-1842. The reclamo was to be exercised through the federal courts, particularly in the Supreme Court. Its object was twofold: first, to protect the "general rules" of the Constitution; and
second, and more specifically, to protect the "individual guaran2
tees" or rights of many.
Although these proposals never received
congressional approval, they prepared the way for implementing a
26
few years later the writ of amparo at the national level.

II.

BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF THE AMPARO

A.

Early Stage

The Mexican amparo was created slowly, in three successive
stages - each serving to refine and perfect the institution. In the
initial stage, the amparo appeared with its current title in the state
constitution of Yucatin, promulgated on March 31, 1841, following
a proposal drafted in December 1840 by the illustrious Mexican
jurist and native of that state, Manuel Crescencio Rej6n. Rej6n is
properly considered to be one of the founders of the writ of amparo
as well as the first Latin American to define judicial review of the
constitutionality of laws as a legally sacred principle.2 7
The Mexican amparo first appeared in the province of
Yucatdn because of civil strife between the liberal party, which
sought to reestablish a federal system, and the conservatives, who
sought to retain the unitary regime created by the aforementioned
Seven Constitutional Laws of 1836. The amparo was instituted by
the temporarily dominant governing faction of the liberal, or federalist, party as a product of victory and a means to protect its
gains. 28
24. On the French institution, see A. BLONDEL, LE CONTRO LE JURISDICTIONNEL DE LA
CONSTITUTIONALITE DES Lois 173 et seq (Paris 1928). On the Supreme Conservative Power
in Mexico, see BAKER , supra note 4. See also authorities cited at note 5 supra.
25. See Gaxiola, Los Tres Proyectos de Constitucion de 1842, in I DERECHOS DEL
PUEBLO MEXICANO: MbxUco A TRAVES DE Sus CONSTITUCIONES 639 (Mexico 1967); see
also BAKER, supra note 4, at 9-12.

26. See Gaxiola, supra note 25, at 654-86; BAKER, supra note 4, at 18-21.
27. See Eder, supra note 4, at 571-72.
28. See SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACION, HOMENAJE A DON MANUEL
CRESCENCIO REJON (Mexico 1960); see also BAKER, supra note 4, at 12-17; Clagett, supra
note 4, at 421.
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In the second stage of the evolution of the amparo, the writ
was established at the national level in the Act of Reforms of May
8, 1847 which revised the Federal Constitution of 1824, the latter
having replaced the old conservative order. The Act of Reforms
undoubtedly derived from a proposal drafted by another distinguished Mexican jurist and politician, Mariano Otero, who is considered to be the second Father of the amparo. Article 25 of the
new constitutional document contained a provision known as the
"Otero Formula" which provided that the protection granted by
the amparo judgment should contain no general declarations about
the law or act complained of; that is, an amparo judgment holding
a law unconstitutional shall have no effect beyond preventing the
application of the constitutionally defective law to the immediate
party complainant. 29 This aspect of the amparo proceeding persists to the present day.
Finally, recognizing the above developments, members of the
Constituent Congress of 1856-1857, the most outstanding of whom
were Ponciano Arriaga Melchor Ocampo and Leon Guzmdn, established the fundamental contours of the amparo writ in articles
101 and 102 of the Federal Constitution of 1857. Some of these
provisions persist to the present day. Thus, the 1857 Constitution
marks the final step in the birth of the amparo and a point of departure from the earlier phase. At this point, the amparo advanced to
the high degree of complexity which characterizes it today.30
B. FurtherExtensions of the Amparo
The protective shield of the amparo has been slowly extended
since the Constitution of 1857 despite the amparo's exclusive origin
as a procedural instrument designed to protect "individual rights."
The amparo was perfected in various implementing statutes
promulgated pursuant to articles 101 and 102 of the 1857 Constitu29. On the legal and political writings of Mariano Otero, see J. REYES HEROLES, I-Il
MARIANO OTERO: OhRAS 74-82 (Mexico 1967). The 1824 Constitution provides:
The Federal Courts will protect whatever inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise
and conservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and constitutional laws, against any attacks from the Legislative and Executive Powers in both
the Federal and State Governments, limiting themselves to granting such protection
in the specific case at litigation and making no general declaration respecting the
law or act that motivated the violation.
1824 CON ST., spra note 22, art. 25 (as amended 1847). See also BAKER, supra note 4, at 2227; Clagett, supra note 4, at 421-22.
30.

See F.

ZARCO, HISTORIA DEL CONGRESO

EXTRAORDINARIO

CONSTITUYENTE

[1856-1857] 988-99 (Mexico 1956); see also BAKER, supra note 4, at 36-42.
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tion; these were the Laws of Amparo of 1861, 1869 and 1882. These
laws were subsequently incorporated into the Federal Codes of
Civil Procedure of 1897 and 1908 which reflected the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court. The writ of amparo was thus transformed
from an instrument lacking precise contours to a true proceeding
directed against violative official acts, with particular emphasis
placed on the protection of life and liberty of the citizens. Frequently, indeed, did the amparo rescue from firing squads those
condemned to death for political crimes and prevent, although with
some limitations, forced conscription or improper detentions. The
result was a great popular esteem that the amparo still retains today.3 1
In accordance with these governing statutes and code provisions, the amparo acquired two important aspects: (1) the emergence of the indirect, or "double instance," amparo which is tried
in the first instance before the federal district, or trial, court and
which is subject to appeal to the Supreme Court; and (2) the introduction of the direct, or "single instance," amparo against violations committed in definitive judgments which is tried in a single
instance directly in the Supreme Court. The latter aspect of the
amparo proceeding occurred because of a complex of social and
political factors pressuring the Supreme Court to accept an extremely controversial interpretation of article 14 of the 1857 Constitution.
Three centuries of judicial centralism in the Spanish Colonial
Period produced a concentration of lawyers in Mexico City and
Guadalajara, both cities containing two unique appellate courts
called Audiencias (hearing bodies). After Independence, untrained
judges staffed the various state supreme courts and remained subject to the political influence of the state governors. The aforementioned lawyers therefore sought any means - including a liberal
interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution - to diminish the
jurisdiction of local courts and reduce the number of important
cases handled by them. They thus attempted to limit the interpretation of state law by state tribunals and to transfer this power to
the federal courts.32 The means chosen was the writ of amparo.
Bowing to this irrepressible movement, the Supreme Court undertook the review of all judicial decisions in the country, declaring
31. See I. BURGOA, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO 132-42 (11 th ed. Mexico 1977).
32. See H. Fix ZAMUDio, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO 122-28 (Mexico 1964); Noriega, supra
note 16, at 151-74.
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unconstitutional article 8 of the 1869 Law of Amparo which prohibited the amparo proceeding from challenging final judgments of
lower courts.3 3
The 1917 Constitution recognized these developments and established the essential outline of the writ of amparo in articles 103
and 107. Article 107 especially regulates the operation of the writ,
and occasionally does so in great detail. After heated debates, the
Constitutional Assembly gave expression to the propriety of the
direct amparo proceeding against definitive judgments in article 14
of the current federal Constitution (1917) . 34 Moreover, the Constitutional Assembly placed the principle of "legality" in article 1611
and finalized the evolution of the protective scope of the amparo;
now, the protective scope of the amparo would embrace the entire
range of legal norms in the nation, from the highest constitutional
precepts to the most remote municipal regulations. The only exceptions to this broad jurisdictional range would be expressly provided
for in the Constitution and implementing statutes. The develop-

ment of such a jurisdictional range explains the present complexity
of the amparo.36
33. See Fix ZAMUDIO, supra note 32, at 122-28; Noriega, supra note 16, at 151-74.
34. The relevant portion of Article 14 of the constitution provides:
In criminal cases no penalty shall be imposed by mere analogy or by a prior
evidence. The penalty must be decreed in a law in every respect applicable to the
crime in question.
In civil suits the final judgment shall be according to the letter or the juridical
interpretation of the law; in the absence of the latter it shall be based on the general
principles of law.
CONSTITucI6N POLITCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOs (Mexico 1917) [hereinafter
cited as MEX. CONST.].
35. The guarantee of "legality" is derived from the following language:
No one shall be molested in his person, family, domicile, papers, or possessions
except by virtue of a written order of the competent authority stating the legal
grounds and justification for the action taken.
Id. art. 16.
36. In effect, the writ of amparo protects the entire system of legal rights in the country,
but certain acts of government, either constitutionally or by virtue of the Law of Amparo,
cannot be impugned through the writ. These constitute the exception, however, and can be
specifically listed: for example, refusals to authorize the operation of particular kinds of private educational institutions. Id. art. 3 (as amended, Official Daily of Mexico (Diario
Oficial), Dec. 30, 1946); limiting judicial attacks on presidential decisions granting or reinstating lands to farmers - or those not so entitled to bring suit by being certified as small
property holders. Id. art. 27; the expulsion of undesirable foreigners by order of the Federal
Executive. Id. art. 33; congressional enactments relating to declaring the results of elections
for members of Congress and the President of the Republic. Id. arts. 60 & 74(1); official
dispositions relating to all electoral matters. LAW OF AMPARO art. 73 (VII) & (VIII); and
resolutions of the Congress on the responsibility of high officials of federal and state governments for crimes and misdeeds committed under their authority. MEx. CONST., supra note
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This newly acquired breadth of the amparo writ caused one
basic problem in the federal judicial system: the tremendous influx
of amparo proceedings into the federal courts, particularly into the
Supreme Court. 37 Thus, the most important legislative reforms in
the amparo between 1951 and 1968 were directed toward reducing
the backlog of cases before the Supreme Court.
The 1951 reforms in the Law of Amparo created the collegiate
circuit courts, which were patterned after the circuit courts of appeals in the United States.3 8 The express object of the collegiate
tribunals was to assist the Supreme Court in its jurisdiction over
amparo proceedings. The 1968 revisions in the Law of Amparo, in
addition to increasing the number of collegiate courts, 39 redistributed the amparo jurisdiction between the latter and the
Supreme Court. The Congress, taking into account social, economic, and public interests, accorded to the highest court only
those amparo cases deemed to be of "major importance."'
III.

CURRENT OPERATION: DIVERGENT COMPONENTS OF THE

AMPARO

The amparo writ has become a complex legal structure which,
despite its apparent unity and common principles, is comprised of
various procedural instruments - each possessing a peculiar autonomy. This diversity is understandable in view of the various
unique ways that other Latin American countries with legal systems closest to the Mexican system administer their own amparo
proceedings. 4 The Mexican amparo is a combination of procedural instruments or remedies, each with a specific protective function. It can be described as having five diverse functions: (1)
protection of individual guarantees; (2) testing allegedly unconstitutional laws; (3) contesting judicial decisions; (4) petitioning
against official administrative acts and resolutions; and (5) protec34, art. III. For analyses of these non-reviewable areas, see I. BURGOA, supra note 31, at 44792; BAKER, supra note 4, at 131-40; Schwarz, JudicialIndependence, mupra note 3, at 280-8 1.
37. In his classic work, Elarticulo 14: Estudio Constitucional,the eminent Mexican jurist

Emilio Rabasa took note of this congestion and called the centralization of review of all
judicial decisions in the country the impossible job of the court. See E. RABASA, EL ARTiCULO 14: ESTUDIO CONSTITUCIONAL 103-10 (Mexico 1906).
38. See H. ABRAHAM, TaE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150-55 (1962).

39. The legislative reforms of 1968 increased the number of collegiate circuit courts
from the five established in 1951 to seventeen.
40. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 76-78.
41. See Fix Zamudio, Latin American Proceduresforthe Protectionof the Individual,IX

J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 60, 77-86 (1968).
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tion of the social rights of farmers subject to the agrarian reform
laws.4 2
4.

Protection of Individual Liberties

As a device to protect individual rights, the amparo performs
functions similar to the English writ of habeas corpus as construed
by statute and decisional law in the United States. For this reason
the Mexican amparo differs from the amparo in other Latin American countries that have also adopted the amparo as a means of protecting individual freedoms.4 3
Under the current Law of Amparo, any act which threatens
deprivation of life, personal liberty, deportations, or banishment, as
well as any official actions prohibited by article 22 of the federal
Constitution,' may be suspended by way of the indirect amparo.
The amparo petition is filed in the district court in first instance by
the injured party, or in proxy by an individual in the name of any
petitioner unable to file the petition personally, even though the
petitioner's representative may be a juvenile or spouse. In such
cases, the court is vested with the authority to investigate and direct
the process of the petition, including any means necessary to respond to the proxy petition.4 5 This process may result in a decision
to "suspend the act complained of" (suspensibn del acto
reclamado). If the petitioner or his representative has been
threatened with loss of liberty, he must expressly solicit the court
from such a danger.' Initiation of the amparo proceeding is not
42. In addition to the Mexican authors considering the multi-functional nature of the
anparo, foreign writers have also expressed understanding of the various characteristics of
the writ. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 4, at 111-63; Secci, Profdi Consituzionalie Procesuali
del Juicio de Amparo Messiano, 10 REVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITrO E PROCEDURA PENALE
209, 215-36 (1967); Camargo, supra note 7, at 207-12.
43. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 41, at 67-70.
44. These rights protect against:
Punishment by mutilation and infamy, branding, flogging, beating with sticks,
torture of any kind, excessive fines, confiscation of property and any other unusual
or extreme penalties ....
Attachment proceedings covering the whole or part of the property of a person
made under judicial authority to cover payment of civil liability arising out of the
commission of an offense or for the payment of taxes or fines ....
Capital punishment for political offenses. . . ; as regards other offenses, it can
only be imposed for high treason committed during a foreign war, parricide, murder that is treacherous, premeditated, or committed for profit, arson, abduction,
highway robbery, piracy, and grave military offenses.
MEx. Co NST., supra note 34, art. 22.
45. LAW OF AMPARO arts. 17 & 18.
46. Id. art. 123.
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subject to a specific time limit 7 and may be initiated by the petitioner at any hour of the day or night. 8
The amparo petition may be brought orally (comparecencia)in
urgent cases49 or even by telegram so long as the latter is verified by
the petitioner within three days of its transmission." Moreover, the
petition may be filed not only with the nearest federal district court
- which is usually located in the state capital - but also with any
local tribunal; absent both of these judicial authorities, the amparo
petition may be delivered to any functionary of the local or federal
court.5 1 State judges are thus empowered to suspend acts threatening the freedom or physical well-being of the petitioner.52 At the
earliest opportunity, the state judge must transmit the case to the
appropriate federal court. 3
B.

Challenging UnconstitutionalLaws

The most important use of the amparo relates to testing allegedly unconstitutional laws, called "amparo against laws" (amparo
contra leyes). As noted earlier, the amparo contra leyes was inspired by the practice of judicial review in the United States.5 4 In
Mexico, however, it has assumed its own peculiar aspects.
It is noteworthy that in the early years of applying articles 101
and 102 of the 1857 Constitution, and in accordance with the views
of the distinguished Mexican jurists and Supreme Court members
Jose Marii Lozano and Ignacio Luis Vallarta, 55 the sole means of
testing a law of dubious constitutionality was to prevent the application of the law against specific individuals; only the official executing the law could be named as respondent. This was based on
the rationale that any "non-executed" law was considered "a dead
47. Id. art. 22(11).
48. Id. art. 23.
49. Id. art. 117.
50. Id. arts. 18 & 19.
51. Id. art. 40.
52. Id. art. 39.
53. Id. art. 38.
54. Countries with judicial review of the constitutionality of laws most resembling the
system practiced in the United States have been Argentina and Brazil, through their "'extraordinary remedies." See Fix Zamudio, supra note 41, at 76-77.
55. Jos6 Maria Lozano was a member of the Supreme Court for the first time in 1873,
then again from 1888 to 1893. Ignacio Luis Vallarta served from 1877 to 1882, discharging
his duty as President of the Court with such brilliance, even for this short period, that he has
been compared to the illustrious John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court for more than 30 years.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979

13

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 2
WRIT OF AMPARO

letter and causing damage to no one." 56 However, the 1936 Law of
Amparo provides that the unconstitutionality of a law may be attacked by pointing to the passage and promulgation of the law itself
as the act complained of (actos reclamados) and by naming the
promulgating authorities as respondents. 7 This innovation is a
recognition of what the distinguished Italian commentator Francisco Carnelutti called processo al legislatore.5 8
The "relative" or "individual" effects of the amparo judgment
is a fundamental principle of the amparo contra leyes in Mexican
law. This follows the "OteroFormula" and is embodied in both
the Constitution 59 and the Law of Amparo. The latter provides in
part that
[]udgments pronounced in amparo proceedings only apply to
the private individuals or to the moral, 60 private, and official persons soliciting the writ limiting the effects to their protection and
securing, where appropriate, in the special case covered by the
petition, without making6 1any general declaration respecting the
law or act motivating it.
Presently, the amparo contra leyes assumes a double configura56. J. MARIA LOZANO, ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL PATR1O EN LO RELATIVO A LOS DERECHOS DEL HOMBRE, in TRATADO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL HOMBRE 439

(Mexico 1876). This language influenced considerably the jurisprudencia of the Supreme
Court and was later used by Ignacio Luis Vallarta. See I. VALLARTA, EL JuICIO DE AMPARO
Y EL WRIT DE HABEAS CORPUS 119 (Mexico 1896).

57. The Mexican constitutional system vests the law making power in both state and
federal legislative bodies: at the federal level, the Congress - including the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate - passes law which is then instituted by the President of the Republic; the corollary law-making function at the state level is vested in the local, singlechambered legislature and the Governor. See generally F. TENA RAMiREZ, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL MEXICANO 265-326 (Mexico 15th ed. 1977).
58. Carnelutti, Aspetti ProblematicidelProcesso alLegislatore,14 REVISTA DI DIRRITTO
PROCESSUALE I (Italy 1959).

59. The judgment shall always be such that it affects only private individuals, being
limited to affording them redress and protection in the special case to which the
complaint refers, without making any general declaration as to the law or act on
which the complaint is based.
MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 107(11) (as amended, Official Daily of Mexico (Diaria
Oficial), Dec. 30, 1950).
60. "Moral person" means any person or entity other than private individuals or government agencies and officials: e.g., business corporations and farm collectives.
61. LAW OF AMPARO art. 76(I). These particularistic effects of judgments declaring a
law unconstitutional, taken from judicial review in the United States, have been accepted by
the majority of Latin American constitutional systems. It is thus known as "the American
system," as distinguished from the "Austrian system" established in the Austrian Constitution of 1920. The latter implies the nullification of an unconstitutional law with general
effects, or ergo omnes. Regarding this increasingly attenuated difference, see M. CAPPELLETrI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A CONTEMPORARY WORLD 85-100 (1971); Cappelletti, Judicial
Review in ComparativePerspective, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1017, 1033-53 (1970).
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tion.62
1. Unconstitutionalityof the Law. Through what is called an
action of "unconstitutionality of the law," or frontal attack, the unconstitutionality of a law may be attacked in an adversary proceeding in which the complainants are opposed by the state officials
responsible for the passage and implementation of the law in question. These officials may include the federal or state legislatures
that pass the law as well as the President of the Republic or state
governors who implement it. In some instances, cabinet ministers
may also be named as respondent authorities for implementing and
publishing the law.
This form of amparo contra leyes is brought in the first instance
in the nearest federal district court.6 3 Either party may appeal the
district court ruling to the Supreme Court sitting en banc6 (plenary
Supreme Court) by a procedural device known as recurso de
revisibn (review). However, cases en revisibn invoking Supreme
Court jurisprudenciapass to the individual chamber (Sala) having
subject-matter jurisdiction.65 That chamber must apply the
jurisprudenciato the case at hand. In some cases, however, a chamber of the Court may request the plenary Court to modify its jurisprudential thesis and hence establish newjurisprudencia,or confirm
the existing precedent. If the plenary Court establishes new
jurisprudencia,it must reaffirm that departure in five consecutive
decisions before the individual chambers of the Court will be
bound on the new point of law.66
The 1951 legislative revisions of the Law of Amparo recognized two contexts in which laws of dubious constitutionality could
be challenged by way of adjudication. The first pertains to self6 7 statutes or regulations which, by defiexecuting (autoaplicaivos)
nition, effect the legal interests of the complainant immediately
62. See Fix ZAMUDIO, supra note 33, at 175-88.
63. MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 107(VII); LAW OF AMPARO art. 114(1) & (II); ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. 42(111) & (IV).
64. Before the 1957 reforms, the appeal from the district court went directly to the
chamber (sala) with subject-matter jurisdiction. After 1957, however, jurisdiction over appeals challenging the constitutionality of laws was vested exclusively in the plenary Supreme
Court. The 1968 legislative reforms of the Law of Amparo again redistributed jurisdiction
over these appeals between the plenary Supreme Court and its four specialized chambers.
65. See text accompanying notes 128-135 infra.
66. See MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 107(VIII)(a); LAW OF AMPARO art. 84(I)(a);
ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. 2 (IV bis. a).
67. This is the term established by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. See
BAKER, supra note 4, at 170-71.
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upon taking effect. In these cases, the amparo petition must be filed
within thirty days from the effective date of the statute. 6 8 The second was created by article 73(XII) of the Law of Amparo and refers
to all other types of legal dispositions; i.e., where the law or regulation is self-executing but is not challenged within thirty days of the
effective date and where the law is non-self-executing and hence
requires implementing legislation. In both instances, the amparo
petition must be filed within a period of fifteen days69 from the date
the petitioner first becomes aware that his interests are affected by
execution of the law.
Prior to the 1968 reforms of the Law of Amparo, the
jurisprudenciaof the Supreme Court had established that ordinary
remedies need not be exhausted when challenging the constitutionality of a law - a requirement ordinarily present according to the
principle of finality.7" At the same time, however, the Supreme
Court introduced the notion that exhaustion of ordinary remedies
did not affect the time limit for filing the amparo proceeding. This
was based on the rationale that ordinary remedial measures were
concerned only with the "legality" of the acts and not the "constitutionality" of the law or regulation upon which the Act complained
of was based.7
These two confficting rulings provoked a number of problems.
Thus, the 1968 reforms introduced a new paragraph to article
73(XII) of the Law of Amparo which provides that:
[wihen against the first act of execution some recourse or means
of legal defense is brought by which the offending act may be
modified, revoked, or nullified, it will benefit the petitioner to
attack the law by way of the amparo proceeding. The petitioner
will not be considered to have consented to the law if filing
amparo within the fixed period starting from the date of being
notified that the ordinary remedy has failed, even though application for that ordinary remedy may have been based on the illegality (contra constitutionality) of the offending act.72
2. Recourse of Unconstitutionality. This second means of
challenging the constitutionality of a law finds its support in article
133 of the Constitution which was modelled after article VI of the
68.

LAW OF AMPARO

art. 22(I).

69. Id.art. 2 1.
70. See id. art. 73(XV); see also Azuela, Aportacion alEstudio delAmparo ContraLeyes,
VIII REVISTA JURiDICA VERACRUZANA 7 (No. 1, 1957).
71. See BURGOA, supra note 31, at 229-32.
72. LAW OF AMPARO art. 73(XII).
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United States Constitution.73 It is called "recourse" because it does
not directly challenge the constitutionality of the law; rather, it
places in issue the "legality" of the judgment that invokes the statute or regulation in question. In effect, the petitioner requests the
reviewing court to determine whether the trial or ordinary appellate
court decision was based on a constitutionally defective law and
hence was in violation of the federal supremacy clause of article
133.
This direct amparo proceeding, which requires that the lower
court decision be "finalized" by one ordinary appeal, is filed directly with the Supreme Court or nearest collegiate tribunal, depending on the subject-matter and the amount in controversy. The
Supreme Court has long upheld the principle that only federal
courts are empowered to review constitutional questions pursuant
to the grant of authority in article 1037" of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court finally recognized the need to balance the
obligation of state courts under article 133 with article 103's implied "monopoly" jurisdiction of the federal tribunals.7 5 Thus,
when constitutional issues are raised in amparo, state and federal

tribunals possess concurrent jurisdiction to suspend the application
of unconstitutional laws.
Some legal commentators believe that all constitutional issues
must be raised by the petitioner at trial or in the ordinary appellate
process. However, it is the duty of the trial court to determine the
constitutionality of the law before reaching the substantive issues of
73. This Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union that emanate therefrom and all treaties that have been made and shall be made in accordance therewith by the President of the Republic, with the approval of the Senate, shall be the
supreme law of the whole Union. The judges of each State shall conform to the
said Constitution, the laws, and treaties, in spite of any contrary provisions that
may appear in the constitutions or laws of the States.
MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 133. The relevant portion of the United States Constitution
provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made...
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
74. This article provides:
The federal courts shall decide all controversies that arise:
I. Out of law or Acts of the authorities that violate individual guarantees.
II. Because of laws or acts of the federal authority restricting or encroaching on
the sovereignty of the States.
II. Because of laws or Acts of State authorities that invade the sphere of federal
authority.
MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 103.
75. See TENA RAmiREz, supra note 57, at 563-64.
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the case. Thus, this obligation should be considered "incidental" or
"pre-judicial" inquiry of constitutional issues.7 6 This differs from
the United States practice of ruling on motions containing such
challenges 77 only to the extent that the trial court considers alleged
constitutional defects in the applicable statute before the formal adjudication stage and as limited exclusively to the case at hand. Formally, Mexican state courts are still systematically denied authority
to decide constitutional questions presented at trial or in ordinary
appeals. Only the Supreme Court and collegiate tribunals have
that power under amparo, with the further understanding that decisions of the collegiate tribunals are subject to review by the high
court.7 8

Finally, there is current doctrine seeking an end to the "Otero
Formula" as having outlived its historic usefulness. This view calls
for declarations of unconstitutionality to have "general effect"
rather than being limited to preventing the application of the law to
the parties successfully challenging it. The reformists rely not only
on the model of European constitutional courts7 9 but more specifically on the "popular action of unconstitutionality" initiated in Columbia and Venezuela during the Nineteenth Century. More
recently, these Latin American efforts have taken place in El Salvador and Panama. ° The rationale for imposing general declaratory
effect (ergo omnes) lies in the principle of equality under the law as
well as in more practical considerations: simply put, the present
"relative" or "individual" effects of amparo against law judgments
have created a painfully slow and inefficient system of judicial review.
C

The Judicial or "Cassation" Amparo

The judicial or "cassation" 8 2 amparo was imposed during the
76. On the concept of pre-judicial questions in problems of statutory constitutionality,
see M. CAPPELLETTI, LA PREGIUDIZIALITA CONSTITUZIONALE NEL PROCESSO CIVILE 4-68
(Italy 1957).
77. See CAPPELLETTI, .rupra note 61, at 46-68.
78. MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 107(IX); LAW OF AMPARO arts. 83(V) & 84(11).
79. See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 61, at 69-84.

80. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 41, at 76.
81. See Fix Zamudio, La Declaracibn General de Inconstitucionalidady el Juicio de
Amparo, in 11971] BOLETiN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 53; Headrick, El Control
Judicialde las Leyes, XVI REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE MExico 463 (1966).
82. The designation "cassation amparo" has also been accepted by foreign scholars.

See BAKER, supra note 4, at 175-96 (utilizing the phrase "amparo as cassation"); KARST,

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/2

18

Zamudio: A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo
CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 9

past century for social and political reasons. It is of major importance because in practice it accounts for more than eighty percent
of amparo cases before the federal courts. The judicial amparo
bears direct similarities to the French remedy of cassation (casacibn) in that it allows review and annulment of appellate decisions
from all jurisdictions in the country that are inconsistent with the
Constitution. The judicial amparo has its constitutional foundation
in article 1483 and may be brought against judicial and quasi-judicial judgments in criminal, civil - including all mercantile controversies - administrative, and labor cases. This form of the amparo
is tried in original jurisdiction and single instance either with the
appropriate chamber of the Supreme Court or with the collegiate
tribunals, depending on some rather complex jurisdictional rules
outlined in the 1967 reforms of the Law of Amparo. In general,
however, the Supreme Court reviews only those cases considered to
be of major social, economic, and political importance, with the
remainder of cases reviewed by the collegiate courts.
The judicial amparo, following classic rules of cassation, may
be directed against two classes of alleged violations: (1) those committed during the course of the trial which deprive the complainant
of legally available defenses - procedural errors (error en
procedando); and (2) substantive flaws in the judgments themselves
(errorenjudicando). Procedural errors can be appealed only if the
deprivation effects the final decision of the court (sentencia
definitiva).84 Exceptions to this last requirement are few; for example, when judicial error, either at trial or in an ordinary appeal, is
so highly prejudicial as to cause irreparable injury to the complainant or to an absent third party similarly affected. In this case, the
amparo suit is tried in the first instance in the federal district court,
from which an adverse ruling may be appealed in the second instance to the collegiate tribunals.8 5 This substantive-procedural dichotomy served as the basis for the division of jurisdiction between
the Supreme Court and collegiate tribunals in the 1951 revisions of
the Law of Amparo. In the case of the judicial amparo, this dichotomy caused several problems of overlapping jurisdiction. These
conflicts were eliminated by the 1968 reforms.
supra note 4, at 627-29 ("amparo and cassation in Mexico"); Secci, supra note 42, at 226-28
("cassation amparo"); Camargo, supra note 7, at 210-11 ("the cassation amparo").
83. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 176-80. See also note 33 supra.
84. LAW OF AMPARO art. 158.
85. Id. art. 114(IV) & (V).
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Classic rules of cassation also provide that amparo review of
lower court decisions must be strictly limited to reviewing questions
of law; that is, whether the trial court correctly applied the applicable law. Thus, in a judicial amparo proceeding, de novo review is
disallowed.8 6
Finally, the influence of liberal individualism in the Nineteenth Century persists in the amparo principle of "strict law"
(amparo de estricto derecho) applicable to judgments of the civil
courts. The Law of Amparo provides that the amparo court must
confine its opinion to questions raised in the petition or brief; the
court may not revise or amplify any point of law. It is the author's
view that the principle of "strict law" constitutes an unacceptable
formalism in modem jurisprudence.8 7 It is also submitted that the
Supreme Court has improperly applied this principle to amparo
challenges of administrative abuses.
D. Administrative Amparo
Because there is no uniform system in Mexican law for challenging administrative actions and decisions, the position of those
injured by administrative abuse is uncertain. Some hold that the
injured party can find relief before an administrative tribunal,
while others perceive his only recourse as being before the same
administrative authority. In any case, the amparo is always available as a final remedy. It may be used to test administrative actions
of both state and federal officials. This additional dimension of the
amparo was inspired by the lack of an administrative tribunal with
general jurisdiction, with the single exception of the Administrative
Tribunal for the Federal District created in 1971. Thus, the amparo
has assumed the role of an administrative review proceeding. 88
Judicial review of administrative acts in Mexican law has
passed through various stages.8 9 The first - the long period from
Independence to 1936 - developed from the influence of Spanish
colonial traditions as well as from the public law of the United
States. It mandated a system of questioning administrative acts
and decisions before both federal and state courts. However, since
86. Id. art. 78.
87. Accord, BURGOA, supra note 31, at 294-96.
88. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 7, at 721-32; CARRILLO FLORES, LA JUSTICIA FEDERAL Y LA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA 207-50 (1973).
89. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 7, at 733-41; D. HEDUAN VIRU.S, CUARTA DECADA
DEL TRIBUNAL FISCAL DE LA FEDERACI6N (Mexico 1971).
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1936, elements of the French system have been introduced with the
establishment of the Federal Fiscal Tribunal (TribunalFiscal de la
Federacibn) which was created in the image of the French Conseil
d'Etat (Council of State). The Fiscal Tribunal assumed review of
financial decisions made by the federal bureaucracy. Its limited
competency over strictly fiscal matters gradually expanded to the
point where, with the Organic Law of 1967, it now reviews a much
broader subject matter and possesses complete autonomy in rendering decisions. Thus, it must be considered as an agency of administrative justice much closer to the German system than to the
French. 90 In addition to the Fiscal Tribunal, the Administrative
Court of the Federal District (1971), as well as some local tribunals
fashioned after the Fiscal Tribunal, such as those in the states of
Mexico, Veracruz, and Sinoloa, exist for airing complaints of administrative acts.9" Amparo review of decisions from these tribunals is similar to the procedures for the judicial, or "cassation,"
amparo; that is, it is tried in the first instance before the Supreme
Court or collegiate tribunals, depending on the amount in controversy. In those instances where bureaucratic decisions are not reviewable by an administrative tribunal, the amparo will lie only
after the complainant has exhausted ordinary administrative remedies.92 In the latter case, amparo is tried in the first instance in the
district court with the opportunity to seek review of adverse judgments in either the Supreme Court or the collegiate tribunals, depending on the amount in controversy. In both direct and indirect
amparo proceedings, Supreme Court jurisdiction extends to all
cases in excess of $20,000 (U.S.). If the amount in controversy is
indeterminable, or the issue is considered to be "of national importance," the Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction. In this respect the 1968 legislative reforms which introduced this
discretionary criterion followed the model of the writ of certiorari
90. See K. Vogel, Der Gerichiliche Rechtsschutz des Einzelnen Gegeniber der Vollziehenden Gewal in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in I GERICHTSSCHUTZ GEGEN DIE ExEKUTIVE 127-83 (1969); G. Winkler, Der Gerichiliche Rechtsschutz Gegeniber der
Vollziehenden Gewalt in )sterreich, in II GERICHTSSCHUTZ GEGEN DIE EXEKUTIVE 835-86

(1969).
91. In addition to these, fiscal tribunals patterned after the Mexican Federal Fiscal Tribunal have been attempted in the states of Colima, Guanajuato, and Tamaulipas. However,
the latter have failed due to a lack of practical efficiency. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 7, at
719-20.
92. LAW OF AMPARO art. 73(XV).
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in the United States Supreme Court.9 3 Current opinion favors extending this discretionary power to other than administrative matters. 94

E.

The AgrarianAmparo

The fifth and final function of the Mexican writ of amparo was
authorized by the amparo law reform of February 5, 1963 and provides special protection to farmers subject to the agrarian reform
laws. Culminating in the 1976 revision of the Law of Amparo, all
protective provisions relative to the "agrarian amparo" were condensed into one section of the Law of Amparo. 95
These changes are based on the division of real property into
two major categories in the Mexican legal system: (1) private holdings not exceeding a fixed acreage, with the excess expropriable to
the benefit of farmers without land; and (2) social property divided
into two subcategories: (i) communal lands of indigenous (Indian)
villages stemming from pre-Hispanic claims which were reinstated
after a showing of illegal dispossession; and (ii) "ejidal," or land
granted to farmers previously lacking any landholdings and taken
from private owners exceeding the aforementioned limits of farms
classified as "small property" (pequehapropiedad).96 Title to the
communal and elidal lands belongs only to those villages and their
inhabitants with claims to usufruct based on inheritance. Even
when their titles are validated, however, the holders cannot sell or
rent their lands, and all such holdings are regulated by the 1971
Federal Law of Agrarian Reform.
The 1963 revisions of the Law of Amparo expressly benefitted
93. The body of North American literature on certiorari is vast. For present purposes,
see Comment, The ProceduralActs of Certiorari, 4 MIAMI L.Q. 367 (1950).
94.
95.

See A. FLORES, REFLEXIONES DEL SESQUICENTENARIO 99-100 (Mexico 1975).
See LAW OF AMPARO arts. 212-234.

96. The concept of expropriating private land for the benefit of those not possessing
land is based on the Law of Agrarian Reform of January 6, 1915, which has been incorporated into the Mexican Constitution.
The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose on private property such
limitations as the public interest may demand, as well as the right to regulate the
utilization of natural resources which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to
conserve them and to ensure a more equitable distribution of public wealth. With
this view in mind, necessary measures shall be taken to divide up large landed
estates ....

MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 27. Both the Agrarian Reform Law and article 27 must be
viewed as expressing the fundamental social goal of the 1910 Mexican Revolution.
Pequehapropiedad is defined by the constitution as property which "does not exceed one
hundred hectares of first-class moist or irrigated land or its equivalent in other classes of land
under cultivation." Id. See also KARST, supra note 4, at 460-72.
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farmers of those communal villages singled out by the agrarian reform. The revisions were motivated by the inability of farming
families in amparo proceedings to secure adequate legal counsel,
especially in complaints against the federal bureacracy filed with
the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform. Previously, these farmers had
been subjected, through Supreme Court jurisprudencia,to an administrative rule equivalent to what was earlier called "strict
law." 97 It was justifiably assumed that the farmers in the communal and eidal communities were disadvantaged relative to industrial workers. The latter could effectively assert their rights through
mediative bodies called Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration
which were modelled after similar institutions in Australia and
New Zealand. 98 The urban workers enjoyed procedural advantages over the businessmen-employers which derived from a new
current of doctrine termed "social procedural law." The latter
sought to establish balance and equality, with compensation to the
weakest party in the dispute.99 It has been urged that agrarian
courts be established in which the farmers can argue their rights
more effectively. This proposal finds support from trends in other
parts of the world,"° including trends in various Latin American
countries which have attempted agrarian reforms similar to those in
Mexico; for example, those in Bolivia (1953), Chile (1967), Peru
(1969), and Venezuela (1976). ° '
The new provisions that benefit the farmer-complainants include subsidiary representation where the petition for amparo is not
filed within the normal period of fifteen days; in such a case, the
Communal or Eidal Commisariat is empowered to intervene on
behalf of any member of the farming community in defense of his
or their collective agrarian rights.' 0 2 The reforms also reduced the
formal requirements for the agrarian amparo petition, holding that
97. For the Supreme Court's rationale for extending the amparo proceeding to agrarian
matters, see Apendice al Semanario Judicialde la Federacibn, in SEGUNDA SALA (Administrative), Thesis 50, at 105-06.
98. See, e.g., J. PORTUS, AUSTRALIAN COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, 1900-1970 (Sydney
1971); D. MATHIESON, INDUSTRIAL LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 239-303 (Wellington 1970).
99. See Fix Zamudio, Introduccibn al Estudio del Derecho Procesal,in REVISTA IBEROAMERICANA DE DERECHO PROCESAL 9 (Madrid 1965); Cappelletti, Per una Nueva "Giustizia
delLavoro," in GIUSTIZIA E SOCIET.A 305 (Milan 1972); Rodrfguez Pifiero, Drot du Travailet
Procesdu Travail, in PROBLEMES D'ACTUALITEi EN DROIT DU TRAVAIL 125 (Padova 1973).
100. See A. GERMANO, IL PROCESSO AGRAGIO: STUDIO COMPARATIVO SUL DIRITTO
EUROPEO OCCIDENTALE (Milan 1973).
101. See J. MASREVERY, DERECHO AGRARIO Y JUSTICIA AGRARIA 35-66 (Rome 1974).
102. LAW OF AMPARO art. 213(11).
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as long as it contains the basic information, the court may correct
or fill in any omissions; this practice is called "supplying the deficiency of the complaint" (suplencia de la queja deficiente).' 0 3 This
exception to the principle of "strict law" directs the court to correct
errors or deficiencies in the petition as well as to obtain necessary
evidence not provided by the petitioners or respondents.'° The reforms also modify the filing periods for the amparo writ from
fifteen to thirty days from the moment the petitioner is informed or
becomes aware of the violation. °5 Finally, there is no longer a
time limit for petitions involving collective agrarian rights. 10 6 In
these cases, the farmer-petitioners may petition the nearest state
trial judge (juez de primera instancia) who is empowered to suspend the alledged violative conduct pending a final determination
of the issue in a full amparo hearing before the appropriate federal
court. 107

Finally, two new and important provisions should also be
noted. The first prohibits judicial discontinuance due to lapse of
time in collective or communal agrarian rights cases. 10 8 The only
exception to this provision is when the farmers collectively vote to
discontinue the amparo proceeding. The second innovation provides that the amparo judge must suspend any administrative
abuses revealed in the evidentiary hearings, again on the assumption that the farmer-petitioners lack access to adequate legal coun-

sel. 109
IV.

A.

PROCEDURE

Indirect Amparo

The indirect, or double instance, amparo is tried in first instance before a federal district judge employing a simple procedure;
the proceeding is characterized by oral communication, brevity,
and procedural economy. Once the petition is filed, the judge es103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. art. 227; MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 107(11).
LAW OF AMPARO art. 223.
Id. art. 218.
Id. art. 217.
Id. arts. 38, 40, 220 & 233.
Id. art. 231(I).
Id. art. 78. In the revisions of the Law of Amparo of May 28, 1976, this provision

was incorporated into article 225 as follows:
The reviewing authority in amparo suits will resolve whether the challenged acts

are unconstitutional, so and as they may be proven, even when the facts differ from
those alleged in the petition where the petitioners are comunal population centres
(nikcleos depoblacibn) or individual ejidatariosor comuneros.
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tablishes in limine that it has been filed properly before soliciting an
answer from the respondent authorities. 0 The answer, along with
supporting documentation, must be filed within five days. This answer resembles a defense in a common law trial because failure to
respond constitutes an admission of the act complained of. Moreover, a fine may be assessed against respondents who fail to file the
answer."' In addition, all interested third parties must be notified
of the complaint and answer." 12 Once the petition is filed, the judge
sets a date for a public hearing" 3 in which both parties submit evidence and written briefs. In some instances, an opinion by the Fed4
eral Public Minister (public prosecutor) will also be submitted."
At the conclusion of this proceeding, the court enters its final judgment which may be appealed to the Supreme Court or appropriate collegiate tribunal.
Once the appeal is filed, the presiding judge examines the petition for its admissibility and regularity of form. If the petition for
review is granted, each party, as well as the Public Minister, is
given ten days to submit written briefs.'
If reviewed by the
Supreme Court, the case is assigned to a judge, or minister
(ministro), who drafts an opinion (ponencia or proyecto de
sentencia) within a postponable period of thirty days." 6 This draft
opinion is circulated among members of that chamber or the
plenary Court, depending on the issue under review. The draft
opinion is then discussed and voted on in a public hearing." 7 If the
opinion is not accepted unanimously, a justice for the majority
writes an opinion accordingly"' with dissenting opinions (volos
particulares)invited to accompany the court's final disposition of
the case.' '9 In the collegiate tribunals, appeals are received in the
same manner, except that the period for writing the ponencia is
110. Id. arts. 146 & 147.
I1l. 1d. art. 149.
112. Id. art. 147.
113. Id. art. 154.
114. Id. art. 155.
115. Id. art. 90.
116. Id. art. 182.
117. Id. art. 186. This practice, which is peculiar to the Mexican Supreme Court, has
attracted the attention of foreign scholars who find it strange that the hearing excludes the
litigants from participation in the final deliberations, and leaves only debate among the
judges. See, e.g., Calamandrei, Prologue, in PROCESSO E DEMOCRAZIA 10-11 (Padova 1954).
118. LAW OF AMPARO art. 188.
119. On dissenting supreme court opinions, see LE OPINIONI DISSENZIENTI DEI GIUDICI
CONSTITUZIONALI ED INTERNAZIONALI (Scritti Raccolti a Cura di Constantino Mortati, Milano 1964). This work includes articles by Vittorio Denti and other authors.
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much shorter (15 days) and1 there
is no public discussion of the draft
2
opinion or final judgment. 1
B.

Direct Amparo

The direct, or single instance, amparo must be brought directly
before the Supreme Court or nearest collegiate tribunal, and the
court rendering the contested judgment notified in writing as the
respondent. In all cases, copies of the petition must be served on all
interested parties summoning them to defend their legal rights.
Service of the petition is handled through the respondent court.' 2'
Like the indirect amparo, the presiding judge of the reviewing
court examines the petition for its admissibility and conformity
with form and content requirements. 22 If granted, the Federal
Minister is invited to present a written brief. Third parties,' 23 or
those acting as accusers in a criminal trial, can submit written allegations to the Supreme Court or collegiate tribunals within ten days
after being served. 124 Drafting the ponencia, or preliminary opinion, as well as the discussion, approval, or rejection all follow procedures similar to those in the indirect amparo proceeding.
C

ProceduralInactivity

Amparo proceedings are generally conducted in writing. Mexico lacks the Anglo-American tradition of oral argument despite
the national legislature's attempt to secure a place for such a procedure within the legal system. Although the principle of judicial supervision (impulso oficial) dominates amparo proceedings, the
backlog of amparo suits contesting lower courts judgments, administrative abuses, and, more recently, the constitutionality of laws,
has led to the introduction of a sanction called "procedural inactivity" which is imposed on petitioners who fail periodically to renew
their claims; imposition of the sanction results in "termination"
without adjudication on the merits. Article 74(V) of the Law of
Amparo directs that amparo suits in civil - including cases in commercial law - and administrative matters will be "discontinued"
if, in the first instance in an indirect amparo suit or in direct
120. LAW OF AMPARO art. 184.
121. Id. art. 168.
122. Id. arts. 177 & 178.
123. For a discussion of third party status in amparo proceedings, see text accompanying
notes 146-161 infra.
124.

LAW OF AMPARO art. 180.
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amparo proceedings, the petitioner fails to reactivate his case
within 300 days of any prior request or, if no prior request has been
made, within 300 days of the initial filing. On appeal (revisibn) of
the indirect amparo, the petitioner should carefully supervise the
progress of his case in the latter stages to avoid "discontinuance"
(sobreseimiento) because of "caducity," or lapse of the case
(caducidadde la instancia, roughly equivalent to the Anglo-American doctrine of laches)' 2 5 after expiration of the 300-day period.
Discontinuance differs from termination for improperly
brought actions (improcedencia) in that the former invalidates the
entire proceeding as if the complainant had never brought the action. Termination, on the other hand, operates explicitly to affirm
the lower court judgment. Both discontinuance and termination
are prohibited in amparos involving labor and penal cases as well
as in agrarian amparo suits. On the other hand, private landowners
bringing amparo actions against agrarian authorities are subject to
the above requirements and sanctions. Until 1975, amparo complainants challenging the constitutionality of laws were exempted
from these rules, but the impressive backlog of cases in the
Supreme Court prompted a constitutional amendment repealing
this exception. The sanctions of discontinuance and termination in
amparo cases have been severly criticized. 2 6 However, the fact
that these sanctions have been applied with such frequency is an
indication that an excessive number of amparo suits is indeed impeding the work of the federal courts, on the one hand, and that
litigants often abandon their suits and thus fail to comply with the
requirements of article 74(V). The latter article also requires parties to an amparo proceeding to27notify the court when the proceeding is abandoned voluntarily.1
V.

AMP.4RO COURTS

The Mexican Supreme Court, collegiate tribunals, and federal
district courts serve as the principle tribunals for reviewing amparo
125. Translator's note.
126. See BURGOA, supra note 31, at 507-15.
127. Article 74(V) of the Law of.Amparo provides in part:
When the effects of the challenged act have ceased or when other notorious blatant
reasons for dismissal have arisen, the complainant and the authority or authorities
responsible are required to indicate accordingly. If they do not comply with this
requirement, the court can impose a fine ....
These fines have been applied sporadically, and the amounts that can be imposed are increduously small, even though they were not de minimus at the time they went into effect on
January 10, 1936.
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suits; state tribunals may act as auxiliaries to the federal courts in
certain types of emergency cases.
.4.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court is the supreme reviewing authority in the
federal judicial hierarchy. Its jurisdiction is two-fold: first, it reviews ordinary appeals involving questions of federal law; and second, it reviews amparo cases. The Court is divided into four
chambers (salas),each with a particular subject-matter jurisdiction.
These include penal, administrative, civil, and labor. Each chamber has five judges (ministros), with four constituting a quorum for
each chamber.' 28 There are also five auxiliary judges (ministros
supernumerarios) whose principal purpose is to replace absent
judges. In addition, the auxiliary judges serve on the Auxiliary
Chamber which hears amparo cases referred to it by the plenary
Court (tribunal en pleno). 2 9 The plenary, or en banc, session is
comprised of the President (Chief Justice) and all other justices except the auxiliaries. The Court sitting en banc requires a quorum of
30
fifteen justices.
Supreme Court justices are appointed by the President of the
Republic and approved by the federal Congress.' 3' Once appointed, they may not be removed except for cause. Removal must
be initiated by petition of the President which is followed by a trial
conducted by a joint session of Congress. 32 Members of the Court
may also be forcibly retired on reaching seventy years of age. Although Supreme Court justices must be formally confirmed by the
Congress, in practice the Mexican system differs fundamentally
from the system of confirmation in the United States. The Mexican
Congress has consistently given automatic approval to presidential
nominees, primarily because it lacks a strong, influential screening
group like the United States' Senate Judiciary Committee. 133 Legislative deference to the President, however, has not prevented the
Court from exercising its responsibilities independently from the
34
influence of the Executive Branch.
128. ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. 15.
129.
130.
131.
132.

MEX. CONST., supra note 34, arts. 94 & 98.
ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. 3.
MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 96.
Id. arts. 94 & 111.

133. On the selection of Supreme Court justices in the United States, see Kurland, The
4ppointment and Disappointment of Supreme Court Justices, [ 1972] ARIz. ST. L. 183.
134. See Schwarz, JudicialIndependence, supra note 4.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/2

28

Zamudio: A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo
CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 9

The plenary Court is also charged with the supervision and
coordination of all federal tribunals. Mexico, unlike France for example, lacks a Ministry of Justice to accomplish this task. Such a
Ministry was prohibited by article 14 of the 1917 Constitution because it was believed that it would diminish the independence of
the federal judiciary.135
B.

Collegiate Circuit Courts (Collegiate Tribunals)

The collegiate tribunals were created by the 1951 legislative
revisions of the Law of Amparo for the express purpose of assisting
the Supreme Court in the review of amparo cases. According to
article 97 of the Constitution, the circuit judges (magistrados)are
appointed by the Supreme Court for four-year terms, subject to reappointment. Once reappointed, magistrados acquire life tenure
and cannot be removed except in the same manner as members of
the Supreme Court; that is, after a trial by joint session of Congress.
The twelve amparo circuits are comprised of twenty-two circuit tribunals, each having three judges. Nine of these courts embrace the first circuit which sits in Mexico City: three courts for
administrative amparo cases, three for civil amparo matters, one for
criminal cases, and two for labor-management disputes. The remaining circuits are located in the cities of Toluca, Puebla, Monterrey, Guadalajara (two), Hermosillo, Veracruz, Torreon, San Luis
Potosi, Villahermosa, Morelia, and Mazatlan.
All circuits have general amparo jurisdiction' 3 6 and hear both
direct and indirect amparo cases. Subject-matter jurisdiction is
limited to issues considered to be of minor national importance although specific jurisdictional guidelines exist. Only in administrative cases do these tribunals exercise discretionary powers with
respect to matters of "national importance" which normally proceed directly to the Supreme Court. In administrative cases, this
discretion may be exercised even if the amount in controversy is in
excess of $20,000 (U.S.), the ordinary limit of collegiate court jurisdiction.' 3 7 In both direct and indirect amparo suits, decisions of the
collegiate tribunals are non-reviewable as res judicata (cosa
juzgada) unless the decision holds on the constitutionality of a law
or directly interprets a constitutional provision. In these cases, the
135. See ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. 12.
136. By contrast, in 1951, when the collegiate circuit courts were introduced, circuits existed only in the cities of Mexico, Puebla, Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Veracruz.
137. ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. 7 bis.
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intermediate court's decision may be reviewed by the Supreme
38

Court. 1

C

FederalDistrict Courts

The district courts, with one judge presiding, exercise jurisdiction over both amparo cases and ordinary cases involving federal
law, most frequently in criminal matters. They also hear civil cases
and administrative law disputes. However, the district courts share
concurrent jurisdiction with state tribunals to enforce federal laws
or international treaties which affect the legal interests of private
citizens. 139 In such cases, the district courts acquire jurisdiction
only at the initiative of the petitioners. 140
District court judges have a constitutional function resembling
their counterparts in the United States, continuing a practice which
began with their creation in the Mexican Constitution of 1824.
They review indirect amparo cases questioning administrative
acts of state and national authorities which cannot be remedied
through administrative procedures. They also hear initial challenges of unconstitutional laws, procedural errors (errores en
procedando), and violations of the constitutional separation of
41
powers between the state and federal governments.'
Like the collegiate tribunal judges, district court judges are appointed by the Supreme Court to four-year terms, subject to reappointment for life and dismissal only for cause. 142 In total there are
sixty-five district judges throughout the main population centers of
the country, generally in the state capitals: ten reside in Mexico
City - four devoted to criminal cases, four to administrative cases,
and two to civil and labor cases. The remainder have general competency. All such tribunals are hierarchically dependent on the collegiate tribunals embracing their respective districts. 143
138.

LAW OF AMPARO arts. 83(V) & 84(11).

139. MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 104(l).
140. Note that ordinary appeals of federal court decisions - as opposed to amparo appeals - are brought from the district courts to a separate system of appellate courts called
the unitary circuit courts. These were established long before the appeals courts for amparo
cases - the collegiate circuit courts - by the constitution of 1824. Presently, there exist
eleven such unitary circuits, in the cities of Mexico (2), Hermosillo (2), Toluca, Guadalajara,
Monterrey, Puebla, M6rida, Torrebn, and Mazatlhn.
141.

LAW OF AMPARO art. 114.

142. MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 97.
143. ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY arts. 37-51.
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State Courts

State judges serve as auxiliaries to the federal judiciary in
amparo proceedings under two special circumstances: (1) when the
petition alleges acts threatening life, personal liberty outside a judicial proceeding, or physical well-being, and when collective agrarian land rights are at issue if, in both cases, a federal district judge
is unavailable;" and (2) where certain actions in criminal matters
are challenged, such as an invalid arrest warrant or service of process, in which case the aggrieved party may select amparo relief in a
district court or in the state court of appeal immediately superior to
the court rendering the judgment. If the state court takes jurisdiction in amparo, it proceeds in the same manner as would a federal
district court.' 4 5
VI.

PARTIES TO AMPARO SUITS

Parties to the amparo proceeding consist of the petitioner, respondent authorities, interested third parties, and the Federal Public Minister. 4 6
The amparo petitioner is termed the "injured party"' 4 7
(agraviado) and is always an individual or collective "person" suffering a personal, immediate, and direct injury through an act of a
public authority.'4 8 In principle, the amparo can be brought only
by private persons, although under exceptional circumstances it
may be brought by public agencies; for example, to defend their
propertied interests.' 49 In addition, Supreme Courtjurisprudencia
has established that directors of public agencies at the national or
federal district governing levels, as well as federal decentralized
agencies or boards (organismos descentralizadosfederales), may
challenge by way of the direct amparo those decisions of the Federal Tribunal of Conciliation and Arbitration relating to conflicts
between the agencies or boards and their government employees.' 50
144.

LAW OF AMPARO arts. 38, 40 & 220.

145. Id. art. 37.
146. Id. art. 5.
147. Id. art. 5(1).
148. Id. art. 4. Thus, the amparo cannot be sought for "indirect" injuries. For controlling Supreme Court precedent on this point, see Apindice al Semanario Judicial de la
Federaci6n,in TRIBUNAL EN PLENO Y LAS SALAS DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA, The-

sis 26, at 47 (1975).
149.

LAW OF AMPARO art. 9.

150. This jurisprudential thesis can be found in .pendice al Semanario Judicial de la
Federacibn, in CUARTA SALA (Laboral), Thesis 92, at 99-100 (1975).
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Respondent authorities (autoridadesdemandadas) are those accused of violating the petitioner's legal or constitutional rights.
They are called "those responsible" (responsables)'5 because they
not only execute, but may order, the action contested in the amparo
proceeding. 15 1 Jurisprudencia of the Supreme Court has estabfished a classical concept of authority which includes any agency or
official who disposes of public power and thus exercises public acts.
The same concept of authority, however, does not embrace the decentralized public agencies which have become increasingly numerous and which, on occasion, reflect greater power than agencies
more highly dependent on the chief executives of the state and federal governments.' 5 3 This jurisprudencia holds, however, that the
exception in the case of decentralized agencies does not operate to
immunize the Mexican Institute of Social Security and the Institute
of the National Fund for the Worker's Lodging (INFONAVIT)
from amparo suits when these bodies allocate worker-owner quotas
for tax revenue purposes. In the latter capacity, the Institutes act as
autonomous fiscal agencies (organismosfiscales autbnomos) and
54
hence possess the requisite authority to be subject to amparo;1
otherwise, they are not subject to amparo challenge because they
supposedly lack the requisite "authority" in the distribution of so55
cial services entrusted to them.1
The injured third party (terceroperudicado),or interested person (interesado),is one who has an interest in preserving and perpetrating the act complained of. The Law of Amparo distinguishes
56
three, and possibly four, categories of injured third parties.
In civil law matters - broadly defined to include commercial
and employment disputes - the injured third party is the original
adversary of the amparo plaintiff. Thus, this judicial amparo, or
what was earlier termed a cassation amparo, interposes third parties
as direct adversaries of the amparo petitioner; it is only artificially
that the legislature interposed the titular authority of the appellate
court under review. The latter lacks this character defacto because
151.

LAW OF AMPARO art. 5(11).

152. See id. art. II.
153. Apindice al Semanario Judicial de la Federacibn, in TRIBUNAL EN PLENO Y LAS
SALAS DE LAS SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA, Thesis 53, at 98.
154. See [1972] MEX. LAB. & SOC. SEC. LAW, labor arts. 267 & 268; LAW OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE NATIONAL FUND FOR THE WORKER'S LODGING art. 30.
155. See Apendice al Semanaria Judicial de la Federacibn, in SEGUNDA SALA (Administrative), Thesis 291, at 492 (1975).
156. See LAW OF AMPARO art. 5(111).
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it acts only as a transmittal agent for the disposition of the trial
judgment57or, in exceptional cases, by attaching an explanatory
opinion. 1
In criminal cases, the Law of Amparo affords third party status
to persons entitled to indemnity for civil liability arising from the
commission of the crime. This status is not necessarily limited to
the victim, for the victim has no guaranteed role in the penal process according to federal and state criminal codes. Thus, when a
convicted criminal contests the conviction or sentence, it is the public minister who is most prominent in opposing the amparo. Third
party status accrues only to persons injured by the commission of
the crime who intervened in the criminal proceeding to claim indemnity for civil liability assessed as part of the final sentence or
who asserted civil liability on the part of those with custodial or
Implicitly then, in
supervisory responsibilities over the accused.'
state or federal
to
the
leaves
criminal cases the Law of Amparo
public minister who prosecuted the original case the responsibility
59
of invoking all other third party interests in the amparo hearing.
In administrative amparo cases, third party status is accorded
to the person or persons who solicit the execution of the administrative act complained of. In cases involving the general public good,
it is virtually impossible to admit all parties into the amparo proceeding. Thus, bonafide third party status is limited to those who
registered their "support" prior to initiation of the amparo suit. 6
Finally, the legislature accords to the Federal Public Minister
the status of "third party" even though his intervention is limited to
the submission of a brief in cases involving the "public interest."
However, neither the Law of Amparo nor Supreme Court decisions
authorize him to introduce evidence, to bring appeals, or other actions which may be brought by "genuine parties" to the proceedings. Thus, the Federal Public Minister cannot be categorized as an
"equal party" as the term is defined by Supreme Court
jurisprudencia, even though his agent initiated the original prosecution in criminal cases. The minister is best viewed as an auxiliary
157. Id. arts. 163 & 169.
158. See id. art. 5(III)(b). In Apindice al Semanario Judicial de la Federacibn, in
PRIMERA SALA (Penal), Thesis 203, at 421 (1975), the Penal Chamber affirmed that victims of
crimes lack legal standing to litigate amparo suits against criminal court judgments acquitting the defendant.
159. See LAW OF AMPARO art. 180.

160. See Apindice al Semanario Judicialde la Federacibn, in CUARTA SALA (Laboral),
Thesis 536, at 888-89 (1975).
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to the amparo judge in his role of submitting briefs and as overseer
of the progress of the proceedings.' 6' Nevertheless, the 1976 revisions in the Law of Amparo conferred upon the public minister the
right of appeal in cases in which he has intervened. It appears,
however, that this power is purely formal because the same reforms
provided no concrete procedural means to exploit this opportunity.
VII.

PREVENTIVE (INJUNCTIVE) MEASURES

The amparo process contains a remedy called "suspension of
the act complained of (suspensibn de los actos reclamados) which
enjoins or suspends the actions of the respondent authority. The
purpose of this injunctive proceeding is to preserve the rights of the
petitioner until a final judgment is reached and to avoid the infliction of irreparable harm. Supreme Court and collegiate tribunal
precedent has evolved guidelines to improve the effectiveness of
these measures, which have gradually become part of the governing statutes of the amparo.'6 2
Currently, injunctive measures can be divided into two broad
categories: the first consists of suspensions sought by way of the
indirect amparo, while the second is brought directly to the court
that is being challenged.
In the first, the request for injunctive relief is filed in the first
instance in the district court; the concession or denial of suspension
may be reviewed by the collegiate tribunals. 163 Two subcategories
of this form of relief are possible. First, an action comparable to
the temporary restraining order and injunctive relief sought by way
of writ of habeas corpus in the United States is available - called
"official suspension" (suspensibnde oficio). This suspension may be
issued by order of the judge without an adversary hearing on the
preliminary showing of the plaintiff, or a friend or relative, that the
act complained of threatens death, deportation, or other acts proscribed by article 22 of the Constitution."' Official suspension may
also be ordered under more general circumstances when the act
complained of threatens "irreparable injury,"' 16 5 or where some
confiscatory action is threatened against farmers subject to the
161. See LAW OF AMPARO art. 5(IV). See also BURGOA, supra note 31, at 324-28; A.
NORIEQA, LECCIONES DE AMPARO 341-55 (Mexico 1975).

162. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 233-38.
163. Prior to the 1951 reforms of the Law of 4mparo, all appeals from district court
suspensibnes of official acts went exclusively to the Supreme Court of Justice.
164. LAW OF AMPARO art. 123(I).
165. Id. art. 123(11).
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agrarian reform laws.166 In each instance, the order to suspend the
act complained of may be by way of telegram under emergency
situations. 67 A second version of the suspensibn may be granted
only after the injured party directly petitions the judge and specifies
all responsible parties. After the answer is filed, a finding on the
facts is made in a full evidentiary hearing. This form of the
suspensibn may68 not be granted until the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing.

Neither form of the suspensibn may be conceded if it would
threaten the "social interest" or "public order," which are defined
in rather broad terms; 169 for example, when suspensibn would tend
to perpetrate centers of vice, drug trafficking, or the commission of
other crimes. Suspensibn will also be denied if it would tend to
cause irreparable injury. In the event suspensibn threatens the
rights or interests of third parties, the petitioner is required to post a
bond (garantia)in an amount sufficient to cover potential injury 17in0
the event the- petitioner does not prevail in the final decision.
Likewise, petitions involving property rights may require the third
party to post a bond as well (conlragarantia),which may be remitted to the amparo petitioner on a showing that the latter should
recover his legitimate legal costs and proprietary damages incurred
while bringing suit. 17 1 The federal amparo judge fixes the amount

of all such bonds. 17 Finally, to guarantee the flow of public revenue, a petitioner who attempts to suspend a decision involving
in controversy if he
fiscal or tax matters must deposit the amount
73
has otherwise made no prior payment.
This suspensibn may be issued in two steps. It may be granted
provisionally when commission of the act complained of is imminent and when the damages will likely be irreparable. In this instance, the court has the discretion to "paralyze" (paralizacibn)the
act by provisional suspension (suspensibnprovisional). This coun-

terpart to the preliminary injunction in the United States may continue in effect until a full evidentiary hearing determines whether
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. art. 233.
Id. art. 123.
See id. arts. 131 & 134.
See id. art. 124.
ld. art. 125.
See id. arts. 125-127.
Id.art. 128.
See id. art. 135.
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the suspensibn should be granted permanently (suspensibn
definitiva) or dissolved.
In effect, these injunctive measures are of major importance in
the amparo process because they seek to preserve the rights and
interests claimed by the plaintiff and to avoid further injury to the
parties. They always apply according to the principle of rebus sic
stantibus - that is, the court may alter the remedy at any time to fit
the particular circumstances, even if an appellate court has already
affirmed the first judgment on appeal. 74 Legislation also permits
the remedy to be invoked even though it was not initially prayed
suspensibnes issued may
for nor considered by the trial court. 5 All
76
be appealed to the collegiate tribunals.
The second type of injunctive relief seeks to stay the execution
of a judgment and is filed directly with the judge rendering the decision. In the case of a criminal conviction, the writ is granted de
oficio and without remand. 77 Suspensibn of civil judgments follows procedures governing indirect amparos; concession of the
suspensibn must await the outcome of the amparo appeal. 78 In the
case of labor tribunal awards favoring the worker, the amparo may
only suspend the issuance of the award in an amount in excess of
that required for the subsistence of the worker-litigant. 179 The ruling on the request for suspensibn can be appealed to the Supreme
Court or nearest collegiate tribunal through the recourse of "com180
plaint" (queja), itself a part of the amparo network of remedies.
Petitioning the "offending" judge for relief8 bears a likeness to the
ancient English writ of error coram nobis.' '
Some legal opinions in Mexico, 82 as well as Supreme Court
jurisprudencia,8 3 view the effect of suspensibn as merely conforming to the original meaning of amparo - protection. That is,
174. See id. art. 140.
175. See id. art. 141.
176. Id. art. 139.
177. See id.art. 171.
178. See id. art. 173.
179. Id. art. 174. Injunctive measures cannot be granted against labor tribunal awards
for the worker unless the amount in controversy exceeds six months wages at present worker
rates. Six months is the period considered necessary for the disposition of amparos on the
merits. See Apndice al Semanario Judicial de la Federacibn, in CUARTA SALA (Laboral),
Thesis 253, at 238 (1975).
180. See LAW OF AMPARO art. 95(VIII).

181. Translator's note.
182. See, e.g., BURGOA, supra note 31, at 701-05.
183.

See, e.g., Apendice al Semanaria Judicialde la Federacibn,in TRIBUNAL EN PLENO Y
Thesis 196, at 324.

LAS SALAS DE LA SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA,
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maintaining the status quo rather than restoring the complainant to
a pre-injury status. But the Law of Amparo and some judicial opinions confirm that, although this may be the general rule, some cases
warrant constitutive and even restitutive relief.'8 4 Such exceptions
would seem particularly appropriate where the act complained of
threatens loss of liberty outside the judicial process. In this case,
the suspensibn would have to remove further obstacles to rectifying
the damage on the merits presented by petitioner. This school of
thought thus perceives the need to provide greater flexibility in exercising suspensibnes. Too often, it holds, do judges grant or deny
mechanically petitions for provisional suspensibnes without care85
fully examining the peculiar facts of each case.'

VIII.

APPEALS

The Law of Amparo provides three means of appealing
amparo judgments: "review" (revisibn), "complaint" (quea), and
"reclamation" (reclamacibn).
The term revisibn derives from the amparo statutes of 1869 and
1882 and the accompanying Codes of Civil Procedure which established a mandatory review of amparo trial judgments before the
Supreme Court - the latter decision being final.
The most important appeal by revisibn is made from decisions
of first instance. In these cases, the Supreme Court acquires jurisdiction when the petition contests the constitutionality of a law or
federal regulation issued by the President of the Republic; when, in
agrarian rights cases, collective claims are made under the agrarian
reform statutes, or when similar rights are invoked by private farmers (pequeha propiedad); and when the responsible authority is a
federal administrator as long as the amount in controversy exceeds
$20,000 (U.S.). At the court's discretion, jurisdiction may be asserted over any case involving the "national interest" regardless of
the amount in controversy. The appeal en revisibn also lies against
"crucial" decisions on amparo petitions, such as the rejection of the
petition or dismissal of the action without a hearing. 86 The
Supreme Court may also review appeals en revisibn in criminal
cases involving acts violative of the fundamental protections of arti184.

See LAW OF AMPARO art. 136.

185. Particularly outstanding on this point is R. COUTo, TRATADO TE6RICO-PRACTICO
DE LA SUSPENSION EN EL AMPARO 218-60 (Mexico 1957).
186. LAW OF AMPARO art. 83.
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cle 22 of the Constitution.18 7 Finally, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over collegiate tribunal decisions on amparo contests of
lower court decisions if the latter involve constitutional questions
unless the intermediate court's decision was based on its own controllingjurisprudenciaor that of the Supreme Court. 188 All amparo
appeals not heard by the Supreme Court are heard by the collegiate
tribunals. 89
The queja, or complaint, lies against judicial error not ordinarily subject to revisibn. These include procedural errors made during the course of trial which are not reflected in the final judgment
granting or denying amparo; when judicial error occurs during the
course of revisibn; or when a court of first instance has failed to
comply with cease and desist orders of the Supreme Court or collegiate tribunals. 90 Other responsible authorities may be made to
account for failure to comply with provisional or definitive suspensions issued by the federal district courts.' 9' The queja may also be
92
used to contest judgments of the latter courts in amparo cases.'
The "reclamation" may be brought against the President (chief
justice) of the Supreme Court or of any of the individual chambers
or collegiate tribunals for errors in the processing and assignment
of amparo cases and is heard either before the plenary Court or the
judicial department immediately superior to the court in ques93
tion.

IX.

DECISIONS AND EXECUTION

The amparo may grant or deny protection, or dismiss the action as legally or materially lacking sufficient substance to be decided on the merits. Judgments on the merits are purely
declaratory. Rejection means that the act complained of was legal
or constitutional, while dismissal certifies only that the petition can94
not be resolved on the basis of the arguments or facts presented.
A decision granting relief to the petitioner constitutes a decision of
nullity (fallo de nulidad). It thus comports with the French princi187. Id. art. 84. The text of article 22 is reproduced at note 44 supra.
188. LAW OF AMPARO arts. 83(V) & 84(11).

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. art. 85(11).
Id. art. 95(VI) & (VIII).
See id. art. 95(11), (IV) & (IX).
Id. art. 95(V).

193. ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. 13(VII) (9 bis); LAW OF AMPARO

art. 103.
194. See BAKER, supra note 4, at 232-33.
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pies of cassation by directing the respondent authority to restore the
petitioner to the full enjoyment of his legal or constitutional rights.
The judgment, again, is strictly limited to the immediate parties to
the action. 195
In addition to the effect of nullity, the grant of amparo has the
quality of a mandamus. In the case of positive acts, it directs the
respondent official to restore the state of affairs existing before the
violation.' 96 If the act complained of is negative in nature, amparo
directs the respondent officials to comply with the statutory, regulatory, or constitutional requirements of due process. In this respect,
injunction and the
the amparo order is similar to the mandatory
197
writ of mandamus in Anglo-American law.
Another aspect of the amparo which bears directly on the decision is the concept of supplying the deficiency of the complaint
(suplencia de la defciencia de la quea). If deficiencies are discovered, the amparo judge has the power, and at times the duty, to
correct any such omissions. In the case of farmers subject to the
agrarian reform laws, defects in the presentation of evidence must
also be remedied. This aspect of the writ of amparo is peculiar to
the Mexican amparo.
The judicial obligation to correct deficiencies in the pleadings
was introduced in the 1917 Constitution. Originally, it applied exclusively in criminal matters before the Supreme Court.'9 8 However, the 1951 legislative reforms extended the obligation to
embrace worker-litigants in labor disputes. This extension effectively upheld various statutes which the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional in itsjurisprudencia,and the practice is now
expressly authorized by the Constitution'9 9 and the Amparo
Law. 2° The 1936 and 1976 revisions went even further and extended this protection to the collective and individual rights of
farmers subject to the agrarian reforms in almost every aspect of
and the mentally ill were also
litigation.2 ° 1 In 1974, 2juveniles
02
protection.
this
granted
195.

On the general effects of decisions by cassation tribunals, see Ancel, Rt/iexions sur

I'Eude Comparative des Cours Suprimes et le Recours en Cassation, [1938] ANNALES DE
L'INSTITUT DE DROIT COMPARE DE L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS 286.
196. LAW OF AMPARO art. 80.
197. See Clagett, supra note 4, at 431-37; Schwarz Thesis, supra note 4.
198. MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 107(11).
199. See id.
200. See LAW OF AMPARO art. 76.
201. See id. art. 225.
202. Id. art. 78.
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In some instances, however, amparo courts have not rigidly
applied the principle of "strict law" and hence have informally expanded the practice of judicial remedies for defective pleadings. It
would be preferable, as advocated by one current of legal opinion,
that the practice of "strict law" be abandoned as incompatible with
modem jurisprudence. This view maintains that judicial remedies
for defective pleadings are no more than practicing the ancient
Latin principlefurisnovit curia - that the judge knows the law and
must
apply it even though the parties have failed to properly invoke
it. 203
The Law of Amparo establishes very strict requirements for
enforcing amparo judgments which are binding on all responsible
authorities. The amparo judge must supervise compliance with the
decree within twenty-four hours of notice, although the nature of
the act complained of or the inability of the official to comply immediately may prolong that deadline. 2°4 The amparo court is empowered to request compliance with the order from the immediate
superiors of the respondent authorities if the latter refuse to execute
the decree.2 °5 When an amparo judgment by the Supreme Court
decrees a law unconstitutional, the petitioner or co-petitioner alone
is protected against the application of the impugned law by the respondent officials named in the complaint. 2°6
Judicial amparo judgments, whether by the Supreme Court or
collegiate tribunals, direct the respondent judge to reinstate any
procedural safeguards violated or to issue another judgment consistent with the amparo ruling. 20 7 According to Supreme Court precedent, authorities directly involved in the act complained of, as well
as all other individuals who, by virtue of their official capacity, participate in the execution of the act, must comply. 20 8 Continued failure to comply, obstruction of compliance, or repetition of the act
complained of authorizes the petitioner or the amparo court in first
instance to file a complaint before the plenary Supreme Court en
203. On the obligation of the judge to apply the law even when it may be improperly
argued by the parties, see Jolowicz, The Active Role of the Courtin Civil Litigation, in PUBLIC
INTEREST PARTIES AND THE ACTIVE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 167-277
(1975).
204. LAW OF AMPARO arts. 104 & 105.
205. Id. art. 105.
206. See Rupp-v. Briinneck, Vigoriti & Linde, Admonitory Functionsof Courts,20 AM. J.
COMP. L. 387 (1972). The three authors represent West Germany, Italy, and the United
States, respectively. The essay deals generally with the problem of executing decisions which
declare statutes of provincial or national legislatures unconstitutional.
207. LAW OF AMPARO art. 106.
208. See NORIEGA, supra note 161, at 750-53.
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banc. The latter studies the complaint and, if meritorious, may impose the sanctions provided by article 107(XVI) of the Constitution:
that the official execute the court order under penalty of dismissal
and criminal prosecution.2" 9 If the non-complying official is a constitutional officer (de fuero constitucional), he may only be dismissed after a trial of impeachment before a joint session of
Congress. 210 The plenary Court, however, must communicate the
charges to Congress before any such proceeding may be initiated.2 1 '
Finally, the Law of Amparo provides that the amparo judge, or
circuit judge appointed by the appropriate circuit tribunal, may direct the execution of the judgment. He may directly supervise the
execution of the order if the amparo has ordered the immediate
release of a petitioner incarcerated on criminal charges. If the order is not executed within three days, the judge may order not only
the respondent authority but all prison officials to comply forthwith.2 12
X.

BINDING PRECEDENT

(Jurisprudencia)

It was noted earlier that there exists no Mexican counterpart to
the Anglo-American rule of stare decisis. Both the Supreme Court
and collegiate tribunals, however, are authorized to issue
jurisprudenciawhich applies to all state and federal courts and administrative tribunals. The concept of jurisprudenciais unique to
Mexican law and originated in the Federal Code of Civil Procedure
of 1908.2 3 Subsequently, the concept ofjurisprudencia was promoted to constitutional status with the 1951 legislative amendments.2 14
Until 1968, only the Supreme Court was authorized to establishjurisprudencia,and this power was limited to amparo cases interpreting the Constitution, federal laws, and international
agreements. Although formal respect was accorded state tribunals,
209. LAW OF AMPARO arts. 105 & 106.
210. MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 111. See also TENA RAMIREZ, supra note 57, at
583-603 for an analysis of the responsibilities of high federal and state officials, which relates
in part to the grounds and procedures for impeachment under the United States Constitution.
211. MEX. CONST., supra note 34, art. 109.
212.

LAW OF AmPARO art. I11.

213. [1908] MEx. CODE CIV. P. arts. 785-788.
214. See MEx. CONST., supra note 34, art. 107(XIII). See also BAKER, supra note 4, at
251-66; Cabrera & Headrick, Notes on JudicialReview in Mexico and the UnitedStates, 5
INTER-AMERICAN L. REv. 253, 264-65 (1963).
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in practice the latter followed Supreme Courtjurisprudencia. The
1968 legislative reforms of the Law ofAmparo, eventually incorporated into constitutional article 107, broadened the scope of
jurisprudencia to include all cases which come before the federal
courts. 2 15 Currently, both the Supreme Court and collegiate tribunals issue jurisprudencia by holding the same point of law in five
consecutive judgments or "theses." In the Supreme Court, these
decisions require a majority of fourteen justices of the plenary session or four justices in each of the four specialized chambers. In
the collegiate courts, all three judges (magistrados) must join the
decision.2 16 Jurisprudenciamay subsequently be construed by the
same majorities holding a contrary
point of law with an accompa17
nying explanatory opinion.'
All precedent and other important decisions are published in
the main federal court reporter, the Semanario Judicial de la
Federacibn, which originated in 1870. The Supreme Court publishes an Apindice to the Semanario approximately every ten years
which contains the major points ofjurisprudenciaand other fundamental theses of case law. The most recent Apcsndice appeared in
1975 and contains a compilation ofjurisprudenciaand other important decisions from the 1917 Constitution forward. In January,
1974, the Supreme Court initiated the monthly Boletin which updates important decisions of that Court as well as those of the circuit tribunals. This Boletin is an attempt to compensate for the
delays in publishing the Semanario, but publication of the Boletin
was interrupted in 1976.
There also exist some valuable but unofficial compendiums
which contain noteworthy precedent and decisions. Since 1972, the
Institute of Legal Research at the National University of Mexico
has published, in quarterly editions, significant opinions of all adjudicatory organs, such as the Federal Fiscal Tribunal and the Administrative Court of the Federal District.
215. The relevant part of article 107 of the Constitution, following the 1968 reform, provides that
[tihe law shall specify the terms and cases in which the precedents of the courts of
the federal judicial branch are binding, as well as the requirements for their modification.
MEx. CONST., supra note 34, art. 107(XIII).
216. LAW OF AMPARO arts. 192-194; ORGANIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY art. 95.
217. LAW OF AMPARO art. 194.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/2

42

Zamudio: A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

XI.

Vol. 9

CONCLUSION

The writ of amparo is a procedural institution of significant
proportions. Its evolution has been shaped by foreign as well as
national developments, both attempting to impart to the amparo a
scheme of constitutional controls on official acts - borrowed from
the United States Constitution of 1787. The amparo, however, has
acquired its own peculiar characteristics despite these influences.
After a slow but inexorable development, the amparo has become
an extremely complex institution. In addition to its original role of
protecting individual guarantees and the separation of federal and
state powers, social and historical events have served to broaden its
protective scope. These developments have made the Mexican
amparo unique compared to other Latin American versions of the
amparo. In addition to protecting individual liberties in a manner
similar to the writ of habeas corpus, the amparo contra leyes is a
means of contesting laws and regulations of dubious constitutionality. The judicial, or "cassation," amparo provides the petitioner the
means to challenge the legal basis of both federal and state tribunals in a manner similar to the French remedy of cassation. Official acts of the federal, state, and local administrations which are
not subject to adequate review in administrative tribunals or
through ordinary non-judicial administrative remedies may be contested by way of the amparo. Thus, the amparo has acquired the
role of an administrative review proceeding (proceso contenciosoadministrativo). Finally, the amparo has evolved into a crucial instrument for the protection of collective and individual agrarian
rights - the writ of amparo in ejidal and agrarian matters.
In sum, the Mexican amparo is among the most comprehensive procedural instruments of our time. It constitutes the final
stage in the Mexican legal process as demonstrated by the quantity
and diversity of legal disputes which culminate in the federal courts
as amparo litigation. Thus, the amparo now serves as the guardian
of the entire Mexican judicial order, from the highest constitutional
precepts to the most modest ordinances of municipal government.
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